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The problem of how we link a text with its source—the 
meaning of authorship— is at the centre of Jorge Luis Borges‟s 
story Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote. The narrator of the 
story asserts confidently that Pierre Menard, a fictional author 
whose chief work was an exact, word-for-word recreation of 
portions of Cervantes‟s Don Quijote, was a genius rather than 
a plagiarist, and the 
story as a whole 
provides an intriguing 
and disconcerting 
rationale for that 
assertion. This article 
argues that the story is 
profoundly troubling to 
theories that invoke the author or other aspects of context to 
interpret a text, and for that reason useful as a probing tool 
into more recent conceptions of the relationship between 
author and reader, including but not limited to those of Roland 
Barthes and Gérard Genette. I will briefly recapitulate the 
elements of the story most relevant to the discussion of 
authorship before analysing the story‟s implications for Barthes 
and Genette‟s ideas and remarking upon Borges‟s own attitude 
to the problems he has raised. 
I 
Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote takes the form of a pseudo-
essay written by an unnamed narrator, who aims to correct 
some misapprehensions regarding his recently deceased friend, 
the French writer Pierre Menard. The story includes a 
fascinating list of Menard‟s publications, but the narrator 
maintains that his greatest work was unfinished and 
unpublished—“los capítulos noveno y trigésimo octavo de la 
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primera parte del Don Quijote y … un fragmento del capítulo 
veintidós”1 (Borges 48-9). 
He hastens to add that these pages were not copied; rather, 
Menard was imposing upon himself an extraordinarily strict and 
difficult form of composition: to write creatively and to some 
degree spontaneously in Spanish, but to discard all those 
compositions which did not correspond word-for-word with 
Cervantes‟ text, and in addition “razonar de un modo 
irrefutable esa aniquilación”2 (Borges 52). Menard‟s first 
attempt involved trying to put himself into the precise mindset 
of Cervantes at the beginning of the seventeenth century: “El 
método inicial que imaginó era relativamente sencillo. Conocer 
bien el español, recuperar la fe católica, guerrear contra los 
moros o contra el turco, olvidar la historia de Europa entre los 
años de 1602 y de 1918, ser Miguel de Cervantes”3 (Borges 
52-3). But he soon lost interest in this approach, which was 
essentially to rewind history and then simply play it again: a 
process difficult to execute, but nonetheless empty of 
meaning. It would be, he believed, far more interesting to 
arrive at the same end through a completely different chain of 
circumstances: “Ser … Cervantes y llegar al Quijote le pareció 
menos arduo—por consiguente, menos interesante—que seguir 
siendo Pierre Menard y llegar al Quijote, a través de las 
experiencias de Pierre Menard”4 (Borges 53). The first option 
                                                 
1 “Chapters nine and thirty-eight of the first part of Don Quijote and a 
fragment of chapter twenty-two.” Because of the sensitivity of the 
language involved, I have chosen to quote Borges in the original 
Spanish; I will include my own translations in footnotes. These 
translations owe a significant—sometimes word-for-word—debt to the 
New Directions edition of Labyrinths. 
2 “To justify in an irrefutable manner this annihilation.” 
3 “His initial intentions with regard to method were simple enough: to 
know Spanish well, to recapture the Catholic faith, to make war upon 
the Moors or the Turks, to forget the history of Europe between 1602 
and 1918, to be Miguel de Cervantes.” 
4 “To be . . . Cervantes and to so compose the Quijote seemed to him 
less difficult—and so, less interesting—than to go on being Pierre Menard 
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would have involved becoming another author; the second 
preserves Menard‟s identity. 
This is a crucial distinction, for it is precisely the difference in 
authors which allows the narrator to interpret two identical 
passages so differently a few pages later. For ease of 
reference—and because it is well worth re-reading—I 
reproduce the section here: 
Es una revelación cotejar el Don Quijote de Menard con el 
de Cervantes. Éste, por ejemplo, escribió (Don Quijote, 
primera parte, noveno capítulo): 
“la verdad, cuya madre es la historia, émula del tiempo, 
depósito de las acciones, testigo de lo pasado, ejemplo y 
aviso de lo presente, advertencia de lo por venir.” 
Redactada en el siglo diecisiete, redactada por el “ingenio 
lego” Cervantes, esa enumeración es un mero elogio 
retórico de la historia. Menard, en cambio, escribe: 
“la verdad, cuya madre es la historia, émula del tiempo, 
depósito de las acciones, testigo de lo pasado, ejemplo y 
aviso de lo presente, advertencia de lo por venir.” 
La historia, madre de la verdad; la idea es asombrosa. 
Menard, contemporáneo de William James, no define la 
historia como una indagación de la realidad sino como su 
origen. La verdad histórica, para él, no es lo que sucedió; 
es lo que juzgamos que sucedió. Las cláusulas finales—
ejemplo y aviso de lo presente, advertencia de lo por 
venir—son descaradamente pragmáticas.5 (Borges 54-55) 
                                                                                                    
and to so compose the Quijote, by means of the experiences of Pierre 
Menard.” 
5 “It is a revelation to place Menard‟s Don Quijote alongside Cervantes‟. 
This latter, for example, wrote (Don Quijote, Part One, Chapter Nine): 
„…Truth, whose mother is history, that rival of time, that repository of 
deeds, witness to the past, example and warning to the present, adviser 
to the future.‟ 
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This passage has set more than one head spinning. It implies 
that the meaning of a given passage—and we may easily 
extend this arbitrarily down to a single word or up to an entire 
novel or literature—is determined by its context (of which the 
author is a key part), and not by the passage or word itself. 
Howard Giskin phrases it well: “Through Menard‟s recreation of 
the Quixote in a different time and place from Cervantes‟ 
original, Borges implies the simple yet disturbing supposition 
that the meaning of literary works is entirely dependent on the 
varying historical and social contexts in which they are read” 
(103). Strikingly, in this view authorship has very little to do 
with the actual words written on the actual page, since these 
may, by design or chance, be identical to words written by 
some other author at some other time; authorship has to do 
instead with some intangible, perhaps metaphysical identity 
behind the words. 
There is a mysticism in this conception of authorship that many 
readers will find uncomfortable, as Borges no doubt intended. 
It seems absurd to agree with the narrator of Pierre Menard 
that the essence or identity of Menard somehow seeps through 
the same words as Cervantes used. Just in case any readers do 
reconcile themselves to this ghostly presence, however, Borges 
piles problem on top of problem. His narrator first claims to 
sense hints of Menard even in parts of Don Quijote that he 
knows Menard never replicated: 
                                                                                                    
Written in the seventeenth century, written by the “untutored genius” 
Cervantes, this list is a mere rhetorical praise of history. Menard, on the 
other hand, writes: 
„…Truth, whose mother is history, that rival of time, that repository of 
deeds, witness to the past, example and warning to the present, adviser 
to the future.‟ 
History, the mother of truth: the idea is astonishing. Menard, a 
contemporary of William James, defines history not as an inquiry after 
reality but as its origin. True history, according to him, is not that which 
has happened: it is that which we believe to have happened. The final 
clauses—„example and warning to the present, adviser to the future‟—
are brazenly pragmatic.” 
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Noches pasadas, al hojear el capítulo XXVI—no ensayado 
nunca por él [Menard]—reconocí el estilo de nuestro 
amigo y como su voz en esta frase excepcional: las ninfas 
de los ríos, la dolorosa y húmida Eco. Esa conjunción 
eficaz de un adjetivo moral y otro físico me trajo a la 
memoria un verso de Shakespeare, que discutimos una 
tarde.6 (Borges 53-4) 
He then, in the last paragraph of the story, vastly expands the 
range of this type of interpretation—as he views it, an 
enriching of all literature: for, he says, if it is legitimate to 
interpret words that Cervantes happened to have written as 
coming from Menard, then why should we not interpret the 
words of Homer (or any text) as belonging to a later (or 
earlier, or contemporary) writer? If we can choose to read 
Cervantes as if we were reading Menard, then we can also 
choose to read Don Quijote as if it had been written by 
Melville—or, conversely, to read Moby Dick as if it had been 
written by Cervantes. Once we agree with the premise that 
there is no necessary link between a given author and a given 
set of words, every interpretation, even the most apparently 
humdrum, becomes a matter of free choice: “[e]sa técnica de 
aplicación infinita nos insta a recorrer la Odisea como si fuera 
posterior a la Eneida y el libro Le jardin du Centaure de 
Madame Henri Bachlier como si fuera de Madame Henri 
Bachelier.”7 (Borges 59). It is a remarkably disorienting 
thought. 
                                                 
6 “Upon evenings, in leafing through Chapter 26—never attempted by 
him [Menard]—I have recognized the style of our friend and, as it were, 
his very voice in that remarkable phrase: the nymphs of the rivers, the 
dolorous and humid Echo. This efficient conjunction of a moral adjective 
with a physical brings to my memory a line of Shakespeare, which we 
discussed one afternoon.” 
7 “This technique, of limitless application, invites us to read through the 
Odyssey as if it had been written after the Aeneid and the book Le jardin 
du Centaure by Madame Henri Bachlier as if it had been written by 
Madame Henri Bachelier.” 
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II 
The narrator‟s reading of Pierre Menard‟s work seems to rest 
on an interpretation of writing which stems from the 
Saussurean notion that words are a limited set of arbitrary 
signs. However, his reading departs from Saussure‟s theory in 
that what is signified by these signs goes far beyond the sum 
of their associated meanings. According to the narrator‟s view, 
writing involves an intellect ordering a set of arbitrary symbols 
(words): reading involves the examination of that ordering, 
and a perception through it (or, for the more conscientiously 
materialist, reconstruction from it) of the intellect that set 
them down. What is read through both the paragraph by 
Menard and that by Cervantes is decidedly not mere linguistic 
meaning: it is a record of the thought and feeling of each 
author, the one as he composes a pleasant tale about a knight 
from La Mancha, the other as he produces a text that curiously 
happens to resemble, in every detail, a story in another 
language written three hundred years earlier. An 
understanding of the intellect behind the words is 
fundamentally linked to what the text means, and those who 
stubbornly insist upon the surface or linguistic meaning of a 
text and ignore the consciousness that originated it are 
regarded as at best missing the point and at worst 
obstructively literalist (in the literal sense of the word, so to 
speak). This interpretation is intuitively appealing, and 
resonates with much of the everyday language used to discuss 
writing and literature: we regularly speak as though we 
perceive an author hiding just behind the words, one who 
shows us what he/she means with a choice phrase or metaphor 
and who has a distinctive personality attested by a set of 
repeating interests and stylistic choices (and attendant flaws or 
blind spots). Its core assumption is that words can and do 
function as a medium conducting readers to or at least towards 
an understanding of the author‟s meaning, and not merely 
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towards a linguistic comprehension of their structure and 
content. 
The problem is, with a limited set of signs to draw on, more 
than one intellect may produce a given set of symbols. The 
narrator of Borges‟s story knows, in point of fact, that two 
intellects produced the same passage, and if two intellects can 
arrive at the same text, why not three, or a hundred? If words 
are understood to be merely the clothes of thought, however 
ill- or well-fitted, however transparent or opaque, and it is the 
thought itself that is valued, then it makes sense to direct 
one‟s energies past the words and to the imagined author 
behind them. But if the clothes can be worn by anyone, 
anywhere, they lose their ability to help us to see or 
understand the thought. Hence the crux of the story: a 
disconnect between the present text and the distant author. 
That disconnect—and how to reconnect words to some 
meaning beyond the purely linguistic—preoccupied many of the 
literary theorists of the twentieth century. Two of them in 
particular discussed ideas about the relation between text and 
meaning that have direct relevance for Borges‟s story. 
Pierre Menard, originally published in 1939, appeared well 
before the emergence of critical interest in the late 1960s (and 
subsequent decades) about how authorship and context 
influence reading. Along with Borges‟s other writings, it might 
well have been partially responsible for this turn: Mabel 
Basterrechea goes so far as to claim that “[i]n the reading 
proposed here, Borges anticipates all postmodern theory in 
entering upon the problem of reception” (221, my 
translation8). Even though the later reflections address the 
nature of authorship, context, and reading at length—and 
frequently with considerable ingenuity—they do not 
                                                 
8 Original text: “En la lecture propuesta por este trabajo, Borges se 
adelanta a toda teoría postmoderna para inaugurar el problema de la 
recepción.” 
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overshadow Pierre Menard: the questions are still very much in 
play, and, as any reader of the story will attest, can still create 
considerable excitement. For that reason, as well as for their 
relevance to the story at hand, a glance at how two key ideas 
of these latecomers interact with the story‟s suggestions will 
be useful. I will pass in silence over the venerable Jacques 
Derrida; his ideas are at a further remove, and aim at a 
different target, than do those of Barthes and Genette. 
Barthes‟ Le mort de l’auteur picks up, in a sense, precisely 
where Borges‟s story leaves off. Barthes starts with the idea 
that the author is wholly absent from the text, a stronger 
version of Borges‟s narrator‟s conclusion that “author” is a kind 
of empty category, to be filled at the whim of the reader. We 
must be careful, however, with our definitions: Barthes draws 
a distinction, as Borges does not, between the person who 
happens to write a given text and the modern figure of “the 
author”9. He objects strenuously to efforts to tie meaning to 
the latter, and even though the former has his or her role, as 
écrivain or scripteur, it should not, in his view, be overstated. 
As a model he points to Mallarmé, who, he tells us, held that to 
write meant to let a language speak through oneself rather 
than, as a distinct individual personality, to set down words 
marked by an indelible personal stamp10. The idea of a 
disembodied language speaking through a person is, however, 
                                                 
9 “L‟auteur est un personage moderne, produit sans doute par notre 
société dans la mesure où, au sortir du Moyen Age, avec l‟empirisme 
anglais, le rationalisme français, et la loi personelle de la Réforme, elle a 
découvert le prestige de l‟individu” (Barthes 491).—“The author is a 
modern figure, no doubt produced by our society insofar as, at the end 
of the middle ages, along with English empiricism, French rationalism, 
and the personal law of the Reformation, it discovered the prestige of 
the individual.” 
10 “[P]our lui, comme pour nous, c‟est le langage qui parle, ce n‟est pas 
l‟auteur: écrire, c‟est, à travers une impersonnalité préalable . . . 
atteindre ce point où seul le langage agit, « performe », et non « moi »” 
(Barthes 492).— “For him, as for us, it is the language that speaks, not 
the author: to write is to attain, by means of an immanent 
impersonality, that state where only the language acts, „performs‟, and 
not „me.‟” 
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no less mystical than the idea of an author‟s voice seeping 
through a text: perhaps realizing this, Barthes aims at a more 
worldly interpretation in the latter half of the essay, arguing 
that texts are composite creatures, not just containing but 
made up of all the possible quotations and references and 
echoes drawn from the “thousand hearths of culture,” for lack 
of a better translation of “mille foyers de la culture” (Barthes 
494). Careful readers will note that he is still wide of his 
worldly mark: the “thousand hearths of culture” that compose 
a text by means of their emanations, insofar as they are 
separable from texts themselves, are in the same realm as 
Mallarmé‟s “language” and Pierre Menard‟s narrator‟s “author”: 
a metaphysical presence hiding behind the words, an article of 
faith rather than a piece of evidence. 
Still, the notion that we might read the meaning of a text not 
in terms of its author but in terms of a constant stream of 
references to or quotations from a variety of sources is 
intriguing. The process of reading becomes one of recognition 
rather than inference: rather than triangulating from 
knowledge of the text, the context, and the author/authors to 
arrive at a conclusion, meaning is taken in pieces as one 
association or another clicks into place. Barthes‟ emphatic 
assertion that what we recognize are texts or fragments of 
texts is both the cornerstone of the argument and, perhaps, its 
greatest weakness: on the one hand, it seems impossible to 
deny that mere text, without the aid of an author, is sufficient 
to generate the kind of recognition that leads to meaning; on 
the other hand, our ability to recognize analogues and abstract 
similarities means that we are not limited to that text 
(whatever form it may take). Our inferences can play a major 
role—and, as a type of inference, an author might still be 
important. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Barthes and the narrator of Pierre Menard 
do share a basic premise. Barthes may do away with the 
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author, but he is unable to remove the need for something to 
guide our interpretation of a given text: the two would agree 
that a phrase like “he did it” is more or less a set of raw 
materials for the reader, and that it takes on meaning in 
response to its context, both immediate and wider-ranging. 
Barthes and Borges‟s narrator differ primarily in which part of 
the context they believe the reader to be most dependent 
upon. For Barthes, the vast pool of previous experience 
dominates the scene—and presumably not just “pure” reading 
experience. In the mental library which each reader checks in 
order to identify (even if only as a feeling or echo) 
“quotations,” we might expect to find not only written phrases 
but also spoken ones, pure rhythms and sounds, combinations 
of sound and text (for example, deliberate mispronunciations 
or puns), images, complex memories, etc. It seems futile, in 
fact, to try to exclude any part of lived experience: all of it 
may be drawn upon when reading (and presumably when 
engaging in any other kind of interpretive activity). Borges‟s 
narrator, on the other hand, implies that relatively few factors, 
including the proposed author, dominate our reading, and that 
our interpretations depend primarily upon these. He does not 
regard the author as the sole basis from which a reader might 
reason out a given interpretation: we may add into the mix the 
historical period, the culture, and the literary and other 
contexts in which the reader imagines the text to have 
originated. 
This story, however, is pointedly titled Pierre Menard, Autor del 
Quijote, and it is no mere whim that causes Borges to focus 
upon authorship as the central problem. We are intuitively 
familiar with the idea that the same words may mean different 
things when uttered by different people: “The woman who runs 
the new bakery has great buns” is a comment that could be 
taken quite differently depending only on the gender of the 
speaker, to say nothing of character, tone, mood, facial 
expression, etc. This is hardly surprising, given that much of 
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our language learning involves imitation, the act of repeating 
the words of another, frequently with an entirely different 
purpose and meaning. The notion that the originator of the 
words should be taken into account when considering their 
meaning is perhaps not so bizarre as Barthes would have it. 
This brings us to the second key work: Gérard Genette‟s 
Palimpsestes. Genette‟s entire book is concerned with 
problems of identity and derivation, but it opens with the 
phenomenon of doubled (or tripled, etc.) texts, albeit in a 
context rather removed from Borges‟s story. The definition of 
parody has shifted significantly through the ages; Genette 
discusses at some length a definition current from the 
sixteenth through to the nineteenth century, according to 
which parody is precisely the use of words lifted from another 
work to direct the reader to a meaning different from that of 
the original, typically one lighter or more vulgar. Genette cites 
Pierre Menard directly as an example of a “minimal parody”, 
one that is “purely semantic: Ménard [sic] literally rewrites the 
Quijote, and the historical distance between the two identical 
versions gives to the second a meaning very different from 
that of the first” (Genette 24fn, my translation11). Except for 
the qualification that in parody the meaning must shift 
“downwards,” the definition appears to be a snug fit for Pierre 
Menard‟s work. And yet a curious problem arises when we 
consider the narrator‟s insistence that Menard‟s Quijote is an 
original composition. The parts of it that do not correspond 
word-for-word to Cervantes‟ Quijote have been removed, 
certainly, but this is a post-hoc surgery upon a separate, 
already-living thing. The narrator insists on reading Menard‟s 
work not as a parody or reference to Cervantes but as a wholly 
                                                 
11 Original text: “La performance de Ménard . . . est évidemment . . . 
une parodie minimale, ou purement sémantique: Ménard récrit 
littéralement le Quichotte, et la distance historique entre les deux 
rédactions identiques donne à la seconde un sens tout différent de celui 
de la première.” 
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original composition, albeit an extremely peculiar one, 
appearing as it does in every detail to be a seventeenth-
century Spanish novel; but this, the narrator indicates, is a 
tribute to Menard‟s literary skill, not a reflection of its 
provenance. To slot such a work into the category of parody, 
even if we limit ourselves to Genette‟s strictly technical 
definition, would be—if we trust the narrator‟s perspective— 
entirely misunderstanding Menard‟s project. Menard himself (if 
we can indulge, in Borgesian manner, in speculating about the 
opinions of a fictional character) might not have agreed: after 
all, the narrator tells us that he, Menard, did have a vague 
recollection of Don Quijote in mind when he started writing. 
That would bring him into line at least with Genette‟s definition 
of hypertext (that is, a text which more or less explicitly 
depends upon another text for its very existence) and perhaps 
also with the definition of parody. But the narrator insists on 
reading Menard‟s compositions as entirely original texts, which, 
though they happen to be identical with Cervantes‟ chapters, 
cannot be read as a reflection upon them—that is, not as 
parody. 
This bears not only on the problem of what type of literature 
Pierre Menard‟s oeuvre is, but also on the fundamental premise 
of Genette‟s “hypertextuality,” of texts derived from earlier 
texts by some sort of an act of transformation. Consider the 
following problem: Borges‟s narrator repeats his position that 
Menard‟s work is not a hypertext, since it only coincides with 
an earlier text, and is not derived from it; Menard himself 
disagrees. Which one is right? We may pick one side or 
another, but the choice will depend not on a logical 
determination upon which all can agree but on which 
character‟s reading we decide to trust. This is not simply 
because evidence is lacking or confused in this particular case: 
it is because the question of whether any text is a hypertext or 
not is a question of interpretation. This fact is somewhat 
obscured by Genette‟s pragmatic approach, and by his 
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conscious and advertised choice of examples that exhibit 
relatively clear connections with other texts. In all of these 
cases, it is easy to come to a consensus interpretation that 
there is a hypertext-hypotext12 relationship. But we should not 
lose sight of the fact that a connection of any sort is a 
proposition about a text or set of texts: in other words, a 
hypothesis, and hence more vulnerable than it at first appears. 
In everyday terms, we can all remember occasions when we 
were told that a work we had previously assumed to be a 
“stand-alone” was in fact dependent upon some other text—or 
that a work we had presumed to follow some other text was in 
fact written before it. In both of these cases, our seemingly 
untroubled understanding of how the text connected to other 
works was overturned in an instant. Pierre Menard is all about 
the hypotheses we construct in order to read, and what 
happens when we overturn them: it just so happens that one 
of the hypotheses overturned is precisely that there must exist 
(in Genette‟s terms) a hypertext-hypotext relationship between 
two works by different authors that nevertheless contain the 
same words in the same order. It thus serves as a timely 
reminder that the relationships Genette describes, intriguing 
though they may be, depend upon a specific interpretation of a 
given text, and that that interpretation is as subject to debate 
as any other. 
III 
Borges‟s story casts doubt on the viability of efforts to 
identify an author behind the text. Though the story unsettles 
the notion that we can see through a text back to its author 
(or anything else), there is no hint of despair in it, or of 
abandoning the idea of an author altogether, even though it 
is very clear that certainty about authors will remain out of 
reach. The narrator of the story, indeed, speaks of the 
                                                 
12 “Hypertext” denotes, as mentioned above, a text that depends upon 
another for its existence; “hypotext” denotes the text depended upon. 
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uncertainty around authorship as an enriching rather than a 
terrifying prospect: “Menard, acaso sin quererlo, ha 
enriquecido . . . el arte detenido y rudimentario de la 
lectura”13 (Borges 59). The narrator is willing to regard each 
interpretation, whether traditional or newfangled, as an 
ornament—though since the notion of an “original” is 
rendered trivial, they are not ornaments to anything. This 
approach to successive layers recalls Derrida‟s notion of the 
supplement; it is distinct, however, in that while Derrida 
characteristically views the supplement as lacking, there is no 
hint in Borges‟s tale that any interpretation is less valid or 
less potentially positive than another. The notion of 
overwhelming profusion comes up again in La Biblioteca de 
Babel, in a much more sinister form, and the arbitrariness it 
implies is brought into full view14. In Pierre Menard, however, 
the focus is on the freedom bestowed upon the reader by an 
unexpected release of the text from a connection to any 
particular author. The description of traditional reading 
practices as “detenido y rudimentario” even implies that the 
narrator believes his own reading practices to be 
sophisticated and consonant with his age, anticipating the 
postmodern emphasis on the active role of the reader in the 
creation of a text. Even as the story undermines the 
traditional vision of the transparent text, its optimistic (if 
somewhat peculiar) implication that the proper application of 
this new method of reading may result in new insights and 
new riches for the literary world should not be dismissed 
offhand.  
                                                 
13 “Menard, perhaps without any such intention, has enriched … the 
laggard and rudimentary art of reading.” 
14 This story‟s narrator lives within an apparently infinite library, whose 
books are filled with random (or apparently random) sequences of 
letters, which occasionally form coherent words or sentences; all 
possible truths are by definition included somewhere within this infinity 
of symbols, but so are all possible falsehoods, and the denizens of the 
library have no way to distinguish between them. 
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